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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
In addition to those issues raised by appellant in
Case No. 15605, presently pending before this Court,
appellant presents the following issues:
1.

The District Court erred in not releasing

appellant from confinement at the Utah State Hospital after
finding that he had recovered from his mental illness.
Refusal to order appellant's release violates due process
and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
2.

The District Court erred in failing to exercise

its authority requiring the State to provide an appropriate
community placement for appellant.

iii

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.
Case No. 19824

BERNT MURPHY,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant, Bernt Murphy, appeals from the April 30,
1985 ruling of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable David B. Dee, presiding,
denying his Motion for Release from the Utah State Hospital.
Appellant's motion was made pursuant to his right for a yearly
review of his continued incarceration at the Utah State Hospital
after having been found not guilty by reason of insanity to the
offense of Rape in 1972.

The motion was made in accordance with

the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §77-14-5 (1953 as amended).
Appellant seeks consolidation of this appeal with
all facts and legal issues presented in Case No. 15605, insofar as
issues in that appeal are not yet moot.
presently pending before this Court.

Case No. 15605 is

Case No. 15605 is appellant's

appeal from a similar decision rendered in February 1984 after
appellantfs Motion for Release under the same statutory provisions
was also denied.

While Case No. 15605 has remained pending before this
Court, appellant petitioned the District Court in March 1985
for a new yearly hearing on his request for release from the
Utah State Hospital, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-14-5.
Appellant alleged that he is no longer mentally ill and thereby
must be released.

He further renewed his claims that his

continued custody at the hospital since 1972 has been illegal
and that his continued confinement constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment.

Appellant asked for alternative remedies

including adoption of a "New-Jersey Plan"

approach to

release as requested and briefed in Case No. 15605 or an immediate
release based upon the duties of the State to provide support
services for appellant under the provisions of Adult Protectives
Services Act, Utah Code Ann. §55-19-3 (1953 as amended).
After an evidentiary hearing, all motions made by
appellant were denied.
Statement of Facts
Appellant hereby incorporates by reference the Statement
of Facts included within Case No. 15605 (pgs. 3-25) and asks the
Court to consider all facts contained therein in conjunction
with the following supplemental facts adduced at the evidentiary
hearing held before Judge Dee on April 30, 1985.
Appellant, the moving party in a §77-14-5 hearing,
introduced into evidence two letters concerning the condition
and/or progress of appellant since his last hearing before the
District Court in February, 1984 (T.5,7). Addendum A is a letter
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from appellantfs attorney dated January 26, 1985 requested of
officials at the Utah State Hospital information concerning
appellant's right to a yearly review and a request for updated
information.

(Addendum B ) , accepted into evidence by the court

without objection, was a reply letter dated February 26, 1985.
This report was signed by Utah State Hospital personnel, Drs.
Van Austin, Robert Howell and Clinical Director, C. Jess Groesbeck,
who are three of the four doctors who submitted a similar yearly
report to the court in 1984 stating different conclusions.
Each signatory on this letter was present and was subsequently
called to testify.
According to the report of February 26, 1985, appellant
no longer suffers from a mental disease.

Specifically the letter,

Addendum B, states:
February 28, 1985
"Dear Judge Dee:
The following is a yearly treatment progress
report on Bernt Murphy:
Since our 1984 report to the court Bernt has
displayed some improvement. During the past year
we have seen no indications of the signs and
symptoms which have characterized our previous
diagnosis of mental illness. However, he is still,
and will remain, mildly mentally retarded.
(Emphasis added)
He continues to display
emotional and behavioral liability and impulsivity, unrealistic expectations of his skills
and abilities, poor social skills, and inappropriate sexual impulses and controls. Although
these are not healthy features, they do not
approach the threshold necessary to diagnose
a mental illness.
During the past year the treating staff has
given him the opportunity to participate in
industrial assignments. His supervisors report
-3-

that he has been a very good and reliable worker.
In addition, since December he has been allowed
to go on "home visits" to his aunts1 house in
West Jordan and has functioned without incident.
However, his participation in the industrial
assignment and his last home visit were both
curtailed as the result of recent apparently
unprovoked violent threats to another patient
and staff members.
If the court continues his present commitment,
the treatment staff plans to continue counseling,
encourage participation in industrial assignments,
structured participation in a sheltered workshop,
more frequent home visits, and counseling to ensure
that the home visits are both appropriate and
productive.
We are not recommending Bernt's release since
we feel that releasing him from the State Hospital
would be doing a disservice to Bernt and the community.
(Emphasis added)
We feel that he lacks the social
skills and controls necessary to function anywhere
but in a highly-structured inpatient setting and
lacks the ability to provide for the basic necessities
on life or his own welfare. We feel that however
well-intentioned, his release from the State Hospital
would rapidly become a social and individual disaster.
(Emphasis added).
However, we are prepared to certify to the
court that Mr. Murphy does not currently have a
mental disease. (Emphasis added)
He does continue
to have mild mental retardation.
Sincerely, Van 0. Austin, M.D. Forensic Psychiatrist; Robert J. Howell, Ph.D., Clinical and
Forensic Psychology; and C. Jess Groesbeck, M.D.,
Clinical Director" (T.8-11).
Dr. Austin was called by the State on cross-examination
to explain the differing and contradictory conclusions between
the 1984 and 1985 reports.
The report dated January 17, 1984 (cited in appellant's
brief in Case No. 15605 at pg. 15) stated appellant suffered
from:
-4-

Mental retardation; mild; an adult adjustment
disorder with mixed distrubance of emotion and
conduct.
Yet during cross-examination at the 1984 hearing, Dr. Austin
expanded the diagnosis contained in the report by saying that
appellant "also suffered from a psychotic disorder".
(Emphasis added)

(Brief 15605, T. Vol. 1-195).

His report of February, 1985 completely contradicts
the 1984 report as well as his 1984 hearing testimony.

The

contradictions further create questions as to the reliability
of any diagnoses of appellantfs condition by psychiatric
personnel, not to mention the possible motives underlying changes.
In April 1985, under cross-examination from State's Attorney
Creighton Horton, Dr. Austin addressed that particular question:
As As I stated in my letter of January 17,
1984 and then went on to testify, he did have
mild mental retardation and adult adjustment
disorder at that time, which is primarily a
transient disorder.
During testimony questions were brought up
regarding possible underlying psychosis. However,
as I pointed out in my testimony, that was never
really well documented by testing, and, therefore,
was not a certainty. A suspicion perhaps, but
never really documented and certainly not present
during my observations of him (T.12).
Dr. Austin went on to say:
. . . initially there were diagnoses in the hospital
record stating that Mr. Murphy was psychotic. In
reviewing the medical record, however, I did not
really see a firm basis for that diagnosis. Since
that time the primary diagnoses have been mental
retardation as well as various personality disorders.
Again this is an individual call, and I cannot
critique the doctors who make those diagnoses.
However, at the present time I don't feel there
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are enough personality features to make the
diagnoses of a personality disorder (T.13).
Finally, Dr. Austin now testifies in response to the prosecutorfs
questions:
Q: (Mr. Horton) Okay. In your opinion then,
has Mr. Murphy recovered from whatever mental
illness he may have had in the past?
A: I believe that — I believe that he does not
have a mental illness at the present time and,
therefore, would have to say if he had one before,
and I wasn't there then, but if he had one before,
he has recovered from it.
Q:

Okay.

A: And I don't — I want to say I don't see a
basis, really, to make the diagnosis of a psychotic
condition back in 1957. However, I don't — I
didn't have the opportunity to interview him then.
And I reviewed their notes, and based on their
notes I would not have made a diagnosis of a
psychotic condition at that time (T.15).
Q: Doctor, do you have any concerns as to the
possibility of him being dangerous to himself
or to others if released?
A: I think that because of his poor judgment,
his lack of social skills, his lack of occupational
skills, he may be a danger to himself, and because
of his sexual maturity, and again poor judgment,
he may be a danger to others. However, I don't
honestly feel this is due to a mental illness
(T.16,17) .
Dr. Robert Howell, the Utah State Hospital Psychologist and coauthor of the 1984 and 1985 reports also now has contradicted his
own 1984 diagnosis and testimony.

At the 1984 hearing, he

testified that in addition to being mildly retarded and having
an adult adjustment disorder, (Brief 15605 p.15; T. Vol. 1-152):
". . . w e are dealing with a psychotic process,
very likely schizophrenia."
However, during his April 30, 1985 testimony, Dr. Howell
could not recall having ever made such a diagnosis or given such

testimony (T.24,25).

Dr. Howell now relates the following:

Q: (Mr. Horton) In your opinion has Mr.
Murphy recovered from whatever mental illness
he may have had previously?
A: Certainly in my opinion he's recovered from
the adjustment disorder.
If you consider mental retardation a mental
illness, and it is in the DSM III, he has not
recovered from that nor will he ever, in my
opinion. But if you do not, as many people
do not, then I would say that whatever mental
illness he had, if he ever had one, he has
recovered from.
Q: The second to the last paragraph of that letter
dated February 26th of 1985, you express a concern
about his release and do not recommend his release.
A: I think that with the situation the way it is
now it would be inhuman.
Q t And what are the factors that go into that
recommendation?
A: I don ! t think he is able to provide for himself.
I think he is so completely and thoroughly institutionalized that — that he's always going to be
in a protective setting. And I just don!t — you
know I think it's unfortunate, but I think that's
true.
Q: You indicated in that last sentence of the
next to the last paragraph, "We feel that however
well-intentioned, his release from the State
Hospital would rapidly become a social and
individual disaster."
What do your concerns there relate to? Do
they relate in any way to a mental illness or only
to his retardation and personality traits?
A:

An inability to adjust in society.

Q: Would you agree with me that over the years
there has been some confusion as to precisely
what, if any, mental illness Mr. Murphy has
suffered from.
A: I think there's been a good deal of confusion.
I would certainly agree with that. I think there
was some kind of a sweetheart deal between the
-7-

County Attorney and the hospital way back when.
I've always felt that. I don't think he should
have had a defense of insanity to begin with.
Were you involved at all in

—

No.
—

those proceedings?

No, I was not.
You came along then after that had already
occurred?
A: I was there at the time. I was not involved.
I was actually at the hospital when he came to
the hospital the first time.
Q:

I see.

A: But I was not involved. I was consulted on
his case, and I said the same thing then as I've
just got through saying (indicating). And unfortunately it's stubbornness on my part.
Q:

Thank you, doctor.
THE COURT:

That's all.

Ms. Wells?

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MS. WELLS:
Q: Dr. Howell, if you have believed what you just
stated over a period of years, that being that
Mr. Murphy probably was not mentally ill and
should not have been defended on those grounds
in 1972, why hasn't this been reported to the
court before 1985?
A: Well, I think that's a good question. And
last year I was so concerned about his instability
in the hospital, which we called an adjustment
disorder, that in good conscience I couldn't
last year.
Q:

How about in '83 or '82 or '81 or '80?

A: You won't see my signature on anything before
'83.
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Q: Are you aware that Mr. Murphy has been involved
in visits outside the hospital over the last year?
A:

I am.

Q: So despite the fact that he has been in a
more structured environment within the hospital,
he has also had an opportunity to take advantage
of some of those activities which other patients
engaged in outside of the hospital; is that correct?
A:

That's right.

Q: Alright, so it's possible then that his
progress, if that's what it is, may also have
been affected by his involvement in activities
away from the hospital and away from that structure?
A:

I think that's a possibility.

Q: Also are you aware that he has perhaps been
given some opportunities to be engaged in industrial type training?
A: I was told that and so I asked about that this
morning, and I really didn't get a very clear answer
on that this morning.
Q: Assuming that that is the case, though, do
you think that is a contributory factor?
A: I think there is a possibility it is. I
don't think it is, but I think that's a possibility.
Q: Doctor, did you report your feelings concerning
Mr. Murphy's condition and lack of psychotic history
to others who were your superiors or peers at the
hospital?
A:

From the time I first formed that opinion.

Q:

When was that?
When did he first come into the hospital?
1957.

1957. Right at the very first I did. I was
at the hospital then. I was consulted on it. I
said at that time I — he was — he was not competent
to proceed at the time, if I remember right. And
I said at that time I did not think he had a defense
of insanity. And then later after I had — I was
-9-

in California at the time he was found not guilty
by reason of insanity. But I have on many occasions
— raised this same issue last year. I raised it
in 1983. I've been concerned about this for many
years.
Q: I don't recall your testimony of last year
as indicating what you stated today. Did you
testify as to that or am I mistaken?
A: No, I did not. I testified as to my concern
over his adjustment disorder last year.
Q: Doctor, why, when you had the opportunity to
give testimony at that time concerning this in
open court where it can be looked at objectively
by other persons, did you not come forward with —
MR. HORTON: I believe that's been asked and
answered by the doctor.
THE COURT:
question.

Overruled.

Go ahead and answer the

A: Miss Wells, last year when I was in this courtroom every time I tried to say anything other than
yes or no when Mr. Dazey was cross-examining me,
you objected. You even objected to one of his
questions and Judge Dee said you can't object to
your own co-counsel's questions.
A: Alright, despite my strategic interruption
did you — why did you not approach Mr. Horton
with that or myself while we were not —
A:

Yeah

Q:

—

in session?

A: I think Itold you at the prison that I didn't
think he had a definite — that I thought this
was a wrong finding. And I don't recall if I have
ever talked to Mr. Horton about this or not. Bernt
Murphy is precisely one of the reasons why Dr.
Austin and I co-authored a bill trying to make
it more difficult to use the insanity plea. He's
not the only example, but he is one of many
examples of where in an immediate situation we
think we're getting rid of a problem and the
problem just gets bigger, and bigger and bigger.
This was precisely my motivations for participating
in writing the new bill on insanity. (Indicating)
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Q:

When was that bill effective?

A:

It became effective March 31st, 1983.

Q: Before we had the evidentiary hearing last
year on Mr. Murphy? (Indicating)
A:

That's right.

(T.28-34)
Dr. C. Jess Groesbeck,

Clinical Director of the Utah

State Hospital in both 1984 and 1985 certified to the court
that appellant does not currently have a mental illness (T. 37).
Appellant has recovered from any mental illnesses he may have
had in the past.

(T. 37)

Groesbeck concurred with Drs. Austin

and Kowell that mental retardation is not a mental illness
(T. 36).
Despite the Court's express and continued empathy
with appellant's position and agreement with this legal
position (T. p. 39), the Court denied appellant's motion for
immediate release.

Judge Dee stated:

"I think the creation of a treating facility of
a kind not available in this jurisdiction is the
ultimate bottom line the [Supreme] Court has to
look at." (T. p. 39). . . .
I don't know how to order recreation of a lifestyle
for Mr. Murphy." (T. p. 45)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellant incorporates by reference all facts and legal
issues raised in his case No. 15605, presently pending before
this Court.

Appellant requests consolidation of both appeals
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to the extent that issues raised in this appeal, No. 19824, do
not render moot legal issues raised in Case No. 15605.
While Case No. 15605 has remained pending before this
Court, appellant petitioned the District Court in March 1985
for a new yearly hearing on his request for release from the
Utah State Hospital, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-14-5.
Appellant alleged that he is no longer mentally ill and thereby
must be released.

He further renewed his claims that his continued

custody at the hospital since 1972 has been illegal and that
his continued confinement constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Appellant asked for alternative remedies including adoption
of a "New-Jersey Plan", approach to release as requested and briefed
in Case No. 15605, or an immediate release based upon the duties
of the State to provide support services for appellant under
the provisions of the Adult Protectives Services Act, Utah
Code Ann. §55-19-3 (1953 as amended).
After an evidentiary hearing, all motions made by
appellant were denied.
ARGUMENT
Appellant seeks consolidation of this appeal with all
facts and legal issues presented by appellant in Case No.
15605, insofar as previously raised issues are not yet moot.
Appellant further seeks reversal of the 1984 and 1985 rulings
of the District Court denying release and an Order that the cases
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be remanded to the District Court with authorization for that
Court to order the State of Utah, through its varied agencies
to implement a plan to be scrutinized by the court, whereby appellant
will be released from the Utah State Hospital into an appropriate
community placement with appropriate support services.
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT RELEASING APPELLANT
FROM CONFINEMENT AT THE UTAH STATE HOSPITAL AFTER
FINDING THAT HE HAD RECOVERED FROM HIS MENTAL
ILLNESS. REFUSAL TO ORDER APPELLANT'S RELEASE
VIOLATES DUE PROCESS AND CONSTITUTES CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.
Utah Code Ann. §77-14-5 (1953 as amended) states:
(3) A defendant committed to the Utah State
Hospital pursuant to subsection (2) may apply,
. . . to the District Court . . . for an order
of release on the grounds that he has recovered
from his mental illness.
This provision is neither made conditional nor
qualified.

Therefore, upon such a finding, an order of release

from the District Court is mandatory.

Refusal to order at least

a provisional release is in error and constitutes forbidden
criminal punishment.
Eighth Amendments.

United States Constitution, Fifth and
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7.

The evidence before the District Court as of April 30,
1985, is that appellant, although being mildly retarded, suffers
from no mental illness, if, in fact, he ever had one.

The letter

dated February 28, 1985 from the Clinical Director of the Utah
State Hospital, as well as other professional personnel, in
addition to the testimony of those individuals so certifies and
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are the basis for the court's conclusion.
Once a finding of recovery has been made, the statute
requires no further inquiry by the court.

However, appellant

recognized that this court in State v. Jacob, 669 P.2d 865
(1984) found constitutional the District Court's use of a
"dangerousness"criteria as an additional factor in the decision
to release or not release an insanity acquitee.
Appellant argues the inapplicability of this criteria
on two grounds.

First, Utah Code Ann. §77-14-5(3), quoted above,

concerning release does not address the issue of release.
in §77-14-5(2) is the question of dangerousness addressed.

Only
That

subsection deals only with the initial commitment to the Utah
State Hospital of an insanity acquitee. Such a commitment order
can only be made:
". . . I f the appellant is still mentally
ill and because of that mental illness,
presents a substantial danger to himself
or others."
Appellant argues that use of the criteria contained in subsection
(2) but not in subsection (3), in order to continue his
confinement, constitutes an ex post facto application of that
law.

United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10; Utah

Constitution, Article I, Section 18.

However, if the Court

were not to find application of subsection (2) violative, the
evidence is clear that appellant's alleged "dangerousness"
is not the result of any mental illness, but rather the result
of being retarded and institutionalized.
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Additionally/ the allegations from hospital personnel
that appellant should not be released on the grounds he might
be a danger to himself since without assistance he doesn't
have the skills of survival, is easily distinguishable from the
evidence of dangerousness found in Jacob, supra,
Jacob, confined at the hospital less than two years,
is a schizophrenic, requiring use of anti-psychotic drugs to
control his behavior as well as his stated obsessions with
sexual perversions and the potential commission of violent
acts.

The finding of the District Court was that Jacob was

"extraordinarily dangerous to himself and others."

Jacob, supra

(pg. 3 ) . Jacob is mentally ill and because of his mental
illness he presentes a substantial danger to himself and others.
Appellant, unlike Jacob, is retarded and institutionalized.
He does not require medication.

He is not delusional.

The

unfounded suggestions of his potential dangerousness are made
by those who are responsible for his institutionalization and
whose individual levels of credibility are questionable.
Additionally, conclusions that appellant is
unable to live outside the environs of the Utah State Hospital
are unfounded.

Hospital personnel have conceded (T.30-31)

(Addendum B) that during the last year —• when finally so
allowed —

appellant has benefited from home visits and minimal

job training.
In summary, then, continued confinement at the Utah
State Hospital can only be based upon the fact that, as a
retarded, dependent person, appellant cannot be expected to
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be able to reside within a less structured setting outside
the Utah State Hospital.

To continue confinement on these

grounds exceeds the authority of the State to exercise its
health and general welfare powers and is prohibited, as it
punishes, perhaps for life, on the basis of appellant's
status as a retarded individual.

Robinson v. California,

370 U.S. 660 (1962).
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO EXERCISE ITS AUTHORITY REQUIRING
THE STATE TO PROVIDE AN APPROPRIATE
COMMUNITY PLACEMENT FOR APPELLANT.
Once having determined that appellant is not mentally
ill, it was the duty of the District Court to order appellant's
release from the hospital.
However, recognizing the special requirements and
support required for appellant to overcome his 28 years of
institutionalization and meet his needs as a retarded person
living within a community, appellant did not ask the District
Court for an immediate release.
and inhuman.

To do

so would be insensitive

Rather, appellant requested the court to exercise

its pre-existing authority.
Utah Code Ann. §77-14-5(3) authorizes the District
Court to order relase of a patient previously determined to be
mentally ill.

It is incomprehensible to believe

such an immense power

the

that given

court was not also inherently

empowered to require that such a person receive the support
of the State in resuming or creating a life outside the hospital.
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Just as a trial judge utilizes the resources of
state agencies to supervise a probationer, the District Court
has the authority to order appropriate state agencies to provide
necessary support services for a person discharged from a
mental institutuion.
prison parolees.

Such support services are provided to

Former residents of American Fork Traning

School now reside in community group homes.
Utah Code Ann. §78-3-4 (1953 as amended) enumerates
the powers of the District Court, including the power to:
" . . . issue writs . . . of mandamus
. . . or any other writs necessary
to carry into effect their orders,
judgments and decrees."
Several alternatives were suggested such as
adootion of a olan similar to that accepted by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in In Re Commitment of S.L., 462 P.2d 1252 (New
Jersey 1983) (also cited in appellant's brief in Case No.
15605) in which that court held that requiring the State
to establish and follow a format of gradual release of discharged
mental patients no longer commitable was an appropriate exercise
of the State's parens patriae powers.

The District Court

declined to exercise its power and order implementation of such
a plan. It also declined to order release with attendant supoort
services to be provided pursuant to either the Adult Protective
Services Act, Utah Code Ann. §55-19-1 throuqh §55-19-9 (1953
as amended) as well as the duties of the Clinical Director
of the Utah State Hospital as they pertain

to discharged

patients, as set forth in Utah Code Ann. §64-7-30 (1953 as
amended).

Utah Code Ann. §55-19-1(1) (1953 as amended) defines
a disabled adult as:
" . . . any person eighteen years of
age or older who is impaired because
of mental deficiency . . . or other
cause to the extent that he or she
is unable to care for his or her own
personal safety or to provide necessities
such as food, shelter, clothing and
medical care.
Utah Code Ann. §55-19-1(2) defines the "protective
services" to be provided for disabled adults as:
" . . . [t]hose services . . . furnished
by . . . the Department of Social Servies
. . . or any agency obligated by contract
to provide such services to assist persons
in need of protection to prevent or cause
discontinuance of abuse, neglect or
exploitation until the condition no
longer requires intervention consistent,
if at all possible, to the accustomed life
style of the adult . . . "
Utah Code Ann. §55-19-1(4) (1953 as amended) defines
"protected persons" as:
"those adults for whom the Court has
ordered protection . . . "
The Division of Family Services is, pursuant to this act
required:
"to develop a plan for a coordinated
protective services program . . .
with the goal of insuring that every
person in need of protection will have
easy access to those services."
Utah Code Ann. §55-19-3 (1953 as
amended).
Additional authority for post-release support services
can be found in Utah Code Ann. §64-7-30 (1953 as amended) which
requires:
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". . . [that upon discharge of a
patient from the Utah State Hospital]
an effort shall be made to assure that
any further supportive services required
to meet the patients1 needs upon release
will be provided . . . ."
Although Utah has not before specifically addressed
this problem, having declined release in Jacob, supra, the
questions posed have been decided by the federal district
courts in favor of appellants.
A pattern of requiring federal district courts to
inquire into courses of treatment as alternatives to hospital
confinement has been in existence for at least twenty years.
In Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D. C. Cir. 1966) as a result
of a Habeas Corpus proceeding brought after the District Court
denied petitioners request for relief from hospitalization
in a mental facility, remanded the case to the District Court
with an order that alternatives be explored.

Petioner

Lake

was senile, had poor memory, wandered, and was unable to take
care of herself,

she was nonetheless not confinable.

The District Court was required to investigate
treatment alternatives with every effort to be made to find
a course of treatment the petitioner herself would find
acceptable.
The United States District Court for the District
of Columbia in Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (1975)
addressed the specific issue of governmental responsibility for
post-release support.

In those instances where individuals

were still in need of psychiatric care despite their readiness
for placement in alternative facilities, a duty to provide such

treatment was ruled to be the responsibility of governmental
entities.
The District Court's refusal to order release
with the requisite supportive services given its implicit and
explicit authority, constitutes error and inflicts upon
appellant additional illegal punishment.
CONCLUSION
Failure to order appellantfs release after certification
from the Utah State Hospital that he is no longer insane or has
regained his sanity is an error of the District Court resulting
in continued illegal and unconstitutional punishment.
The District Court has the express and implied
authority to order the State of Utah, through any of its
agencies, to provide an appropriate post-release living
environment away from the confines of the Utah State Hospital.
Failure of the District Court to exercise this authority on
the grounds that because of his retardation and twenty eight
years of institutionalization confinement must be continued at the
hospital is constitutionally prohibited since it constitutes cruel
an unusual punishment upon one who has the status of being retarded.
For all the reasons stated above, the case should be
remanded to the District with instructions that appellant be
released from the Utah State Hsopital under an appropriate
post-release treatment plan.
Respectfully submitted this ^ Y

day of May, 1985.

BROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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PNDER ASSOCIATION
COND F.^sr
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TELEPHONE

TELFPHONE
532-5414
Felony Division

532-1021
Misdemeanor Division

JOHN HILL
P'rprtor

OAPC OF TRUSTEES
OBERT VAN SCIVER
Chairman

GILBERT ATHAY

T e b r u a r y 5 , 1985

Ex-Offiao

ONEL FRANKEL
Ml MITSUNAGA
IENE NIELSEN
AY GROUSSMAN
TEWART HANSON, Jr
DN HINDE
\Y LOWE
DHN OCONNELL
DSEPH A GETER

Dr. Van O. A u s t i n
Utah S t a t e H o s p i t a l
P . O . Box 270
P r o v o , Utah
84601
Re:

Bernt Murphy

Dear Dr. Austin:
Although last yoar's decision by Judge Dee nol to
release Bernt is presently on appeal to the Utah Supreme
Court, it is necessary to continue to afford Bernt his right to
a yearly review. Therefom, before determining whether or not
to schedule a formal evidentiary hearing, I am requesting that
you forward to me, the Salt Lake County Attorney, and to the
Court an evaluation of Bernt's condition, status, and progress
during 1984.
Si ncerely,

i' ; r ( (
pupokn c. wr.i i,s
Attorney at Law
BCW:ps
cc:

J u d g e David 13. Deo
C r e i g h t o n Ilorton
B e r n t Murphy

ADDENDUM B

-23-

UTAH STATE HOSPITAL
100 Years Of Service
February 26, 1985

The Honorable David B. Dee
Judge of the Third Judicial District Court
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
re:
MURPHY, Bernt
Case Number: 15606
Dear Judge Dee:
The following is a yearly treatment progess report on Bernt Murphy:
Since our 1984 report to the court Bernt has displayed some improvement.
During the past year we have seen no indicationss of the signs and symptoms
which have characterized our previous diagnosis of mental illness. However,
he is still, and will remain, mildly mentally retarded. He continues to
display emotional and behavioral lability and impulsivity, unrealistic
expectations of his skills and abilities, poor social skills, and inappropriate sexual impulses and controls. Although these are not healthy
features, they do not approach the threshold necessary to diagnose a
mental illness.
During the past year the treating staff has given him the opportunity
to participate in industrial assignments. His supervisors report that
he has been a very good and reliable worker. In addition, since December
he has been allowed to go on "home visits" to his aunts' house in West
Jordan and has functioned without incident. However, his participation in
the industrial assignment and his last home visit were both curtailed as the
result of recent apparently unprovoked violent threats to another patient
and staff members.
If the court"continues his present commitment, the treatment staff plans to
continue counseling, encourage participation in industrial assignments,
structured participation in a sheltered workshop, more frequent home visits,
and counseling to ensure that the home visits are both appropriate and
and productive.

S OCl8l S©rvlC0$
Norman H. Bangerter. Governor, State of Utah
*'- i~pnn G. Angus. Execi/trve Director

* n *QV*I Opportunity Employ*

Seymour P. Steed. Ed 0 . Superintendent
1300 East Center
PO. Box 270. Provo. Utah 84603-0270
(801) 373-4400

Judge David B. Dee

2

February 26, 1985

We are not recommending Bernt's release since we feel that releasing
him from the state hospital would be doing a disservice to Bernt and
the community. We feel that he lacks the social skills and controls
necessary to function anywhere but in a highly-structured inpatient
e
etting and lacks the ability to provide for the basic necessities of
life or his own welfare. We feel that however well-intentioned, his
release from the state hospital would rapidly become a social and
individual disaster.
However, we are prepared to certify to the court that Mr. Murphy does
not currently have a mental disease. He does continue to have mild
mental retardation.
Sincerely,

Xm 0. (WJM - \w
VAN 0. AUSTIN, M.D.
Forensic Psychiatrist

ROBERT J. HOWELL, Ph.D.
Clinical and Forensic Psychology

C. JESS GROESBECK, M.D.
Clinical Director
VOA:lc
cc:

Creighton Horton, Esg., Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney
Brooke Wells, Esg., Defense Attorney
Byron Stark, Salt Lake County Clerk's Office

